Flexicurity and the European Employment Strategy by Madsen, Per Kongshøj




 

Flexicurity and the European Employment Strategy​[1]​  

By

Per Kongshøj Madsen

Centre for Labour Market Research
Aalborg University
Denmark

www.carma.aau.dk (​http:​/​​/​www.carma.aau.dk​)











Paper presented at the session on 
”Worlds of Work and Welfare in Europe” 
Annual conference of the American Sociological Association
Boston, August 1-4, 2008


Abstract

The interplay between labour markets and welfare states is at the core of the debates about the new Europe, which will be shaped as the result of the Lisbon process. Recently the concept of “flexicurity” has moved into the centre of the debate. Can interfaces between welfare states and labour markets be developed, where flexibility and security come together having “flexicurity” as the outcome? How can flexicurity develop within different national employment systems?  Can the design and implementation of flexicurity arrangements be guided by a set of common principles on flexicurity?
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1. The concept of flexicurity
The fundamental idea behind the concept of flexicurity is that flexibility and security are not contradictory to one another, but in many situations can mutually supportive. Flexibility is not the monopoly of the employers, just as security is not the monopoly of the employees. In modern labour markets, many employers are beginning to realise that they might have an interest in stable employment relations and in retaining employees who are loyal and well qualified. On their part, many employees have realised that to be able to adjust their work life to more individual preferences, they too have an interest in more flexible ways of organising work, e.g. to balance work and family life. So, the foundation is there for a new interaction between flexibility and security, which stresses the potential for win-win-outcomes in situations, which are traditionally conceived as characterised by conflicting interests. 

2. The historical background of the concept
As a concept, the phrase flexicurity was first coined in the Netherlands in the mid-1990s, based on a number of specific conditions. The Netherlands had, in contrast to for instance Denmark, a rather restrictive system for dismissal of permanent employees, which has induced enterprises to increase flexibility in the workforce by hiring groups of temporary workers on fixed-term contracts. Generally these “atypical” workers have a lower level of social security (e.g. rights to unemployment benefit, pensions and holidays) and a lower level of employment security than the permanent staff. The whole point of the Dutch flexicurity legislation, which took effect in 1999, was to correct this imbalance between an inflexible labour market for core workers and an insecure labour market situation for the contingency workforce.

Flexicurity is, however, not a concept describing only the Dutch labour market situation. The wish to combine flexibility with security is also evident in the policy discourse at EU level, in particular in the Commission’s Green paper from 1997: Partnership for a New Organisation of Work, which states: ”The key issue for employees, management, the social partners and policy makers alike is to strike the right balance between flexibility and security”. 

At a number of EU summits, and especially in connection with the Lisbon strategy from 2000, as well as in the European employment strategy, this ambition to strike a better balance between flexibility and security has been voiced repeatedly. However, within the EU system no concrete instruments or guidelines as to how to achieve this desirable state have yet materialised. With respect to this, however, an important step forward was taken in the Presidency Conclusions from the Brussels European Council in March 2006 stating that:

The European Council stresses the need to develop more systematically in the NRPs comprehensive policy strategies to improve the adaptability of workers and enterprises. In this context, the European Council asks Member States to direct, special attention to the key challenge of "flexicurity" (balancing flexibility and security): Europe has to exploit the positive interdependencies between competitiveness, employment and social security. Therefore Member States are invited to pursue, in accordance with their individual labour market situations, reforms in labour market and social policies under an integrated flexicurity approach, adequately adapted to specific institutional environments and taking into account labour-market segmentation. In this context, the Commission, jointly with Member States and social partners, will explore the development of a set of common principles on flexicurity. These principles could be a useful reference in achieving more open and responsive labour markets and more productive workplaces.

Thus an important task for the coming months will be to develop such a set of common principles on flexicurity. This issue will be addressed in the last section of the present paper. 

Also, the concept of flexicurity has in a number of European countries attracted attention in recent years. Prime examples are Germany and France, where it has been seen as a way to loosen the restrictive rules on dismissal and improve labour market flexibility.  However the present unrest in France provides ample illustration of the difficulties involved in implementing alleged flexicurity strategies in practice. 

3. Flexicurity as a strategy, a state of affairs or an analytical tool?
The Dutch scholar Ton Wilthagen at a very early stage defined flexicurity as a policy strategy, more precisely as: 

”A policy strategy that attempts, synchronically and in a deliberate way, to enhance the flexibility of labour markets, work organisation and labour relations on the one hand, and to enhance security – employment security and social security – notably for weaker groups in and outside the labour market, on the other hand”
(Wilthagen 1998)

The popularity of flexicurity as a political strategy is not surprising, given its promise of creating win-win-situations for both employers and employees. 

However in some cases a state of flexicurity has over the years not been reached through implementing a deliberate political strategy, but trough a gradual process of political struggles and compromises with a strong element of path dependency. In such cases, flexicurity can be conceived as:

“Flexicurity is (1) a degree of job, employment, income and ‘combination’ security that facilitates the labour market careers and biographies of workers with a relatively weak position and allows for enduring and high quality labour market participation and social inclusion, while at the same time providing (2) a degree of numerical (both external and internal), functional and wage flexibility that allows for labour markets’ (and individual companies’) timely and adequate adjustment to changing conditions in order to enhance competitiveness and productivity” 
(Wilthagen  & Tros, 2004)

In this later definition, also developed by Ton Wilthagen, flexicurity is no longer a deliberate policy strategy, which makes the definition more relevant in a comparative context and in analysing for instance the Danish case, where flexicurity is the outcome of a long historical development and not a specific political blueprint (cf. below). 

The third and final understanding of flexicurity is as an analytical frame that can be used to analyse developments in flexibility and security and compare national labour market systems. It is this analytical frame that we are going to use below to demonstrate a number of national combinations of flexibility and security. As an analytical frame, flexicurity is closely related to another popular labour market concept, the idea of the Transitional Labour Markets, TLM (cf. for instance Schmid & Gazier, 2002). The basic assumption in the TLM approach is that the boundaries between the labour market and various social systems (such as the educational system, the unemployment system, pension system, private households) must become more open towards transitional states between paid employment and productive activities outside the market.  

4. Forms of flexicurity
Both flexibility and security are multi-dimensional concepts, which come in a variety of shapes. Using Atkinson’s well-known model of the flexible enterprise as a starting point, it is possible to distinguish between four different forms of flexibility: numerical flexibility, working time flexibility, functional flexibility and wage flexibility. A groundbreaking aspect of the flexicurity concept is the linking of these four forms of flexibility with four forms of security. First, job security, which means the security of being able to stay in the same job, and which can be expressed via employment protection and tenure with the same employer. Second, employment security, which means security of staying employed, though not necessarily in the same job; here the general employment situation, active labour market, training and education polices play a key role. Third, there is income security, which relates to being secured income in case of unemployment, sickness or accidents, and is expressed through the public transfer income systems, such as unemployment and cash benefit systems. And finally, combination security, the possibilities available for combining working and private life, e.g. through retirement schemes, maternity leave, voluntary-sector unpaid work etc. 

As illustrated in the figure below, there are sixteen potential combinations of flexibility and security, which, however, are not all conceivable in practical terms (for instance the case of combined numerical flexibility and job security). This matrix is a heuristic tool, applicable for instance in characterising different flexicurity policies or combinations of flexibility and security in certain schemes, or to describe stylized relationships between flexibility and security in different national labour market regimes. 


Figure 1: Possible configurations of flexibility and security

	Job security	Employment security 	Income security 	Combination security
Numerical flexibility				
Working time flexibility				
Functional flexibility				
Wage flexibility				


In the literature, there is some debate concerning the interpretation of the matrix above. Wilthagen & Tros (2004) mainly interpret it as an illustration of different trade-offs between forms of security and flexibility, where the term ”trade-off” signifies that something must be traded for something else. Thus accepting less job security can be balanced by providing other forms of security instead, for instance income security. However, as stated by Leschke et al (2006:3), the situation is more complex: 

First, there is not only a trade-off between flexibility and security. The flexibility gains of employers do not necessarily mean a loss of security among employees; similarly, security gains of employees do not necessarily have to go along with flexibility losses among employers. Therefore, the talk about a balance between flexibility and security – usually thought of as a compromise between employers and employees – does unduly simplify the nexus.

They therefore go on to argue that the flexibility-security nexus can also reflect of mutual supportive or complementary relationship, for instance, when job-security leads to more loyal employees. In other situations, the nexus may lead to vicious relationships, where for instance more job insecurity leads to overall insecurity, lower investments in human capital and – in the longer run – perhaps lower fertility. They therefore call for a more dynamic approach as the one offered by the transitional labour market perspective mentioned above.
 
5. Level, regulation and national forms of flexicurity arrangements
The complexity in the debates about flexicurity is further increased by the fact that flexicurity arrangements may vary according to the level at which they function (national, regional, local or industry/firm-level). Furthermore they may vary according to the actors involved (government, social partners, individual firms or employees) and to the regulative tools applied (law, collective agreements, individual contracts etc.)

Although in general countries will provide examples of most of the possible forms of flexicurity configurations, the comparative studies of often point to certain forms of flexicurity as being prevailing in specific countries. In Germany and Belgium for instance, the emphasis is on more traditional forms of flexibility (working time flexibility and functional flexibility in internal labour markets), whereas the focus in both Denmark and the Netherlands is to a greater extent on numerical flexibility in the external labour market. 

The same goes for the security aspect, where Germany and Belgium still tend to focus on income and job security (even though the Hartz reforms in Germany can be seen as attempts to introduce more focus on employment security). There are, of course, also general tendencies observable across countries, such as increased focus on wage flexibility, functional flexibility and elements of combination security. Some countries are in fact impossible to place within this matrix, as there is no synchronous attention to flexibility and security aspects. This is true e.g. of the USA, where numerical flexibility and wage flexibility rank prior to elements of security, or Spain, where the labour market is split into an insecure and flexible labour market for “atypical” workers and a secure, inflexible one for the full-time permanently employed.

6. The Danish case as a hybrid
In the flexicurity literature, the Danish employment system is often referred to as a prime example of a labour market with a well functioning flexicurity arrangement – even to such a degree that the “Danish model” and “flexicurity” are seen as almost identical. An important consequence of the broad perception of flexicurity outlined above is of course that flexicurity is much more than just a single national model. However, the specific interplay between of welfare state and the labour market in Denmark can be interpreted as an interesting “hybrid” between the flexible, free-market welfare states characterised by high numerical flexibility (liberal hiring-and-firing rules) and the generous Scandinavian welfare regimes of high social security (relatively high benefit levels). Therefore Denmark is an interesting case regularly mentioned in the literature. 

The main characteristics of the Danish flexicurity model are the following (Madsen, 2006):
 
	A flexible labour market with a high level of external numerical flexibility indicated by high levels of worker flows in and out of employment and unemployment; 
	A low level of employment protection, allowing employers to adapt the workforce to changing economic conditions, makes the high degree of numerical flexibility possible. 
	A generous system of economic support for the unemployed
	Active labour market policies aimed a upgrading the skills of those unemployed, that are unable to return directly from unemployment to a new job

It is important to emphasise that while the term “flexicurity” has only recently been associated with the Danish employment system, its basic characteristics has a long history. Thus while the current attention paid to the Danish model is caused by the significant reduction in unemployment since 1993 and the high employment rate, one should not confuse this recent success with the creation of a fundamentally new version of the Danish employment system during the last decade. To the contrary one of the fascinating elements of the story about the Danish labour market is the fact that the model has been able to survive since the founding of the modern Danish welfare state in the 1960s in spite of the economic turmoil of the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore it has been successful in supporting the ongoing structural changes in the economy, which has kept Denmark in a position among the most affluent countries in the world.
 
The Danish labour market model is often described as a ‘golden triangle’, cf. figure 2. The model combines high mobility between jobs with a comprehensive social safety net for the unemployed and an active labour market policy.  In fact the mobility (measured by job mobility, job creation, job destruction and average tenure) is remarkable high in an international comparison. The high degree of mobility from employer to employer is definitely linked to the relatively modest level of job protection in the Danish labour market. Another reason could also be higher risk willingness among workers due to the comprehensive social safety net and probably also the low stigmatising effects of social security in Denmark. 

Despite one of the lowest levels of job protection among OECD-countries (OECD 2004b, chapter 2), Danish workers have a feeling of high job security among all subgroups of workers (Auer and Casez 2003). 

The arrows between the corners of the triangle illustrate flows of people. Even if the unemployment rate is low in an international perspective (5.4 percent in 2004), Denmark almost has a European record in the percentage of employed which are each year affected by unemployment and receive unemployment benefits or social assistance (around 20 percent). But the majority of these unemployed persons manage to find their own way back into a new job. As an indication, the incidence of long-term unemployment as a percentage of total unemployment (6+ months, 12+ months) was in 2004 respectively 45 percent and 22.6 percent in Denmark compared to 60.4 percent and 42.4 percent in EU(15). Those who become long-term unemployed end up in the target group for the active labour market policy, which – ideally – helps them to find employment again. The model illustrates two of the most important effects in this connection. On the one hand, as a result of the active measures, the participants in various programmes (e.g. job training and education) are upgraded and therefore improve their chances of getting a job. This is the “qualification effect” of ALMP. 

On the other hand, the measures can have a motivational (or threat) effect in that unemployed persons, who are approaching the time, when they are due for activation, may intensify their search for ordinary jobs, in case they consider activation a negative prospect. Thus one effect of labour market policy will be to influence the flow from unemployment benefits back to work, also for those unemployed, who do not actually participate in the active measures. A recent study has in fact argued that this motivational effect accounts for the major part of the macro-effect of ALMP (Rosholm & Svarer, 2004). 


Figure 1.2: The Danish flexicurity model (Madsen, 2006)























The social safety net in the shape of unemployment benefit and social assistance for the unemployed together with the high flexibility form the main axis of the model, in the sense that both elements have been characteristic of the Danish labour market for many years. Recognition of the employers’ right to hire and fire at will date back to the September Compromise of 1899. Danish labour market parties here entered into an agreement that focused on labour market disputes and how to solve them, as well as the appropriate role of organisations in the system. This established centralised negotiations and mechanisms for resolving disputes also laid the foundation for the practice of self-regulation by labour market parties in most matters of importance to the labour market. 

The Danish unemployment benefit system is based on the Ghent-system. It has its roots in the early 1900s, and in its present form dates back to the late 1960s. A generous (by international standards) and primarily government-financed benefit support system was established in 1969 and fairly wide frames for support were adopted. Unemployment benefits and the state’s role in financing them were increased, eligibility requirements for insurance and unemployment benefits were reduced, and high levels of compensation for lost income were secured. In return, employers were exempted from compensating redundant employees, as this responsibility was taken over by the state. Consequently, employers have never had to secure employment and pay for redundancies, and the hiring and firing costs of Danish businesses have remained very low.  On the other hand, the active labour market policy stressing upgrading of skills and job training is relatively new. In its present form, it originates from the labour market reform of 1993-94 and subsequent initiatives (Madsen, 2006).

The Danish development of the welfare state and labour market points towards an interesting hybrid between the flexible, liberal welfare states characterised by high numerical flexibility (liberal hiring-and-firing rules) and the generous Scandinavian welfare regimes of high benefit levels. The hybrid model manages to reconcile the dynamic forces of the free market economy with the social security of the Scandinavian welfare states. Some writers may be inclined to call this hybrid unstable and bound to eventually head off in one or the other of the two directions (Hall and Soskice 2001). However, when we have outlined the historical-institutional conditions behind the Danish flexicurity model below, it should be evident that this model is a result of a long evolutionary development, and is supported by relatively stable institutions and class compromises.

Both in the international as well as in the Danish debate there has, from time to time, been a tendency to jump to the conclusion: that the success of the last decade is a result of the flexicurity model just described. It is, however, essential to point out that the positive development in the Danish labour market since the early 1990s is not attributable exclusively to the Danish flexicurity model. Without a successful balancing of the macroeconomic policy and the trends in the international business cycle, the growth in employment and the falling unemployment would not have been possible. The coinciding of low inflation and a halving of registered unemployment rates is also a by-product of a new agenda for collective bargaining and wage formation, which helped the labour market adjust to the shift from high unemployment to full employment while keeping wage increases at a moderate level and not departing from the international trend towards low inflation. This agenda developed gradually during the 1980s and was formalized by a joint declaration of the social partners in 1987, where they stated that they would take the international competitiveness and macro-economic balance of the Danish economy into account during wage-negotiations. 
  

7. Learning from the neighbours?
Given the political attractiveness of flexicurity as a strategy and the accomplishments of the countries where flexicurity is found as a widespread state of the employment system, it is not surprising that there is a great interest in learning from the more successful neighbours. Given the complexity of many flexicurity arrangements and their specific historical, social and political, simple transfers of institutions or policies are rarely feasible. 

The booming literature on policy transfer and Europeanization illustrates the options for, but also the barriers to policy learning either directly from the neighbours or from policies advocated by supranational bodies like the European Union (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Olsen, 2001). Inspired by Vivien Smith (2002) one can list a number of factors, which determine the transferability of policies into a given country. These include its economic vulnerability exemplified by presence or absence of economic crisis and the political institutional capacity, which is inherent in the principal policy actor’s ability to impose or negotiate change. Important factors are also policy legacies and preferences, which determine the “fit” of potential policies with long-standing policies and institutions and with existing preferences. Related to the latter is also the flexibility or robustness of the national policy discourse, determining the ability to change preferences by altering perceptions of for instance economic vulnerabilities and policy legacies. 

With direct reference to the transferability of flexicurity policies, Wilthagen (2005:265) has also stressed the importance of political institutional capacity in the form of mutual trust between the social partners and the government, when it comes to developing flexicurity policies. Adequate central and de-central level platforms and channels for coordination, consultation and negotiation are also highly important. 

The importance of these points is of course related to the core of the flexicurity concept: moving from one configuration of levels of flexibility and security to another will often involve that one of the parties (typically the employees) must accept some form of increased flexibility (and thus uncertainty) in their working life in order to get compensation in the form of improved security arrangements provided by the employers or the state. For the employees this implies obviously the risk of being cheated by accepting more flexibility, but never getting the reward in the form of increased security. Trust created by historical experiences with bargaining processes and maybe supported by some form of state guarantee is necessary. The recent French experience with the Government’s attempt to increase flexibility without having neither negotiated a compromise with the social partners nor presented a clear compensation for the increase in flexibility, is an illustration of this point.  

The issue of economic vulnerability enters the bargaining process around flexicurity arrangements as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, economic crisis can be the factor, which changes political preferences and puts the need for labour market reform high on the political agenda. On the other hand, an economic crisis is rarely a situation, where economic resources for improving worker’s security are abundant. Higher public spending on income security or policies providing more employment security will for instance be hampered by fear of increasing deficits on the public budgets. Such worries can be argued against by pointing to the fact that this public spending must be conceived as investments and will be repaid through the longer term growth stimuli from a more flexible labour market. However, as illustrated by the recent German experience, the rules of the EMU may inhibit increased spending for security arrangements and thus transform flexicurity-policies into pure policies of flexibilisation.  

Finally, one can point to the fact that the pre-existence of a certain institutional infrastructure will facilitate specific flexicurity arrangements. A well-developed system of industrial relations with established patterns of negations between the social partners at different levels and also between will the social partners and Government will of course facilitation the sort of bargaining and compromising, which is important in creating and sustaining flexicurity arrangements. 

Also institutions supported by the public sector can be important. By example a comprehensive public system for adult education and training will make it easier to develop flexicurity arrangements, which involves employment security upgrading the skills of unemployed workers or workers in risk of unemployment. Also a well-developed system of child-care is indispensable for creating security for working parents and thus for a flexible supply of especially younger women on the labour market. 

8. Or from Denmark?
These more general points are all of crucial importance, when considering the options for policy learning from best-practice flexicurity policies in other countries. Obviously they are also relevant, when considering the transferability of the lessons from the specific Danish version of flexicurity. Here one important, albeit rather general message is evidently that a sizeable welfare state with high levels of both taxes and social benefits is not incompatible with a dynamic and well-functioning labour market (cf. Campbell et al, 2005).

The high degree of flexibility on the Danish labour market is thus supported indirectly through a number of welfare state services such as a comprehensive educational system, including adult vocational training and education, a well-developed childcare system, (relatively) well-functioning and publicly financed health care etc. In a labour market perspective, many of these welfare schemes can be viewed as investments in well-functioning structures, rather than costs. This lesson from the Danish experiences can hopefully serve as inspiration for the development of the European social model. 

A further observation from the flexicurity literature, which is fully illustrated by the success of the Danish employment system in recent decades, is that a system of employment security, rather than job security, combined with enhanced levels of external and internal flexibility could be taken as a best practice for Europe (Wilthagen, 2005:265). This message emphasises the positive correlation between low employment protection, generous unemployment benefits and active labour market policy. 

Translated into a direct policy prescription to be used in times of rising unemployment, the main message is that the first handle to pull should not be the one labelled “more job protection”. By doing so policy-makers will only hamper the restructuring of production and employment, which is necessary in order to regain growth and low unemployment. But both in order to support reallocation of workers to firms and sectors with growth potential and in order to combine restructuring with economic and social equality, security arrangements must be in place. Income support to the unemployed is a minimum requirement. But apart from income security, the security arrangements must focus on assisting the unemployed and those in risk of unemployment to get back to employment. 

During Denmark’s specific historical development, this simple message has been turned into a nationwide flexicurity model. As discussed above, the degree to which the Danish lessons can be applied in other countries will depend on their political and institutional legacy and on the specific circumstances, which trigger the call for reforms. Given that the Danish model is embedded in a Scandinavian type welfare state, policy transfer seems most obvious with respect to the other Scandinavian countries and less relevant to for instance Southern European countries. Thus the Scandinavian type of the welfare state provides both several of the supportive elements for the model and also entails the high level of social capital in the form of trust necessary to make negotiated trade-offs between flexibility and security. 

For countries with already low levels of job protection like the UK, the most important lesson from the Danish model could be from its positive experiences with employment security in the form of extensive active labour market policies and adult education. In the German case, learning could focus on establishing the political and discursive preconditions for having negotiations about changing the present configuration of job protection on the one hand and income and employment protection on the other hand. 

However, the aim of this presentation is not to provide detailed prescriptions on how to implement flexicurity policies in specific national contexts. This is a complex task better left to national analysts and policy-makers in the respective countries. In this process, supranational actors like the European Union will of course play an important role by creating mechanisms for and facilitating the exchange of policy lessons and good practices between countries. Here a better comprehension of best practices with respect to flexicurity policies from other countries, including Denmark, can act as an important source of inspiration and can lay the ground for shifts in national discourses, which over time may lead to a “subtle transformation of states” (Jacobsson, 2004). The main attraction of Denmark in this context is therefore its uniqueness as a European country having implemented an encompassing version of a specific form of flexicurity. And as any teacher will know, one real-life example tells more than a torrent of abstractions. 

9. Towards a set of common principles?
As mentioned above the Presidency Conclusions from the Brussels Summit in March 2006 have called for “the development of a set of common principles on flexicurity”.  

Fortunately, the development of such principles will not have to start from scratch. When looking at the rapidly expanding literature on flexicurity and related subjects, one can find a number of more or less general recommendations offered by the various authors. One such example can be found in the work of Schmid and Gazier (2002), who presents four major criteria for transitional labour markets:

a)	Empowerment: empower individuals to cope with the (new) risks of social life
b)	Sustainable employment and income: make transitions pay!
c)	Flexible coordination: establish a new balance between centralised regulation and self-organisation, more decision power to local levels
d)	Co-operation: stimulate local networks and public-private partnerships; the linking of resources

In a more recent study discussing the Hartz-reforms in Germany, Leschke et al (2006:5) list the criteria they will apply in order to assess the reforms in terms of efficient and efficient equitable flexicurity criteria: 

First, we ask to what extent flexibility, especially internal and external numerical flexibility has been strengthened by the latest labour market reforms. To assess the security dimension, we ask whether the measures provide minimum income security to the atypically employed. As state-run labour market policies do not aim anymore at improving job security, we further concentrate on the question if the measures enable transitions into standard employment, as an expression of enhanced employability. Lastly, we try to assess if option security among the atypically employed is improved. Thereby the particular needs of the schemes’ target groups are taken into account. Concerning unemployment, we adopt a broad definition, which includes illegal employment and discouraged workers.

Along similar veins, Wilthagen & Houwerzijl (2005) have searched for a policy checklist that could act as a tool for assessing the extent to which labour market flexibility was reconciled with social cohesion. This was done in the context of the so-called tree model from the Council of Europe’s methodological guide (2005).  Their draft checklist consists of three parts: flexibilisation, employment and income. It is expanded into a rather complex set of tables with indicators that are to be applied in order to assess the overall coherence between flexibility and security in different situations. No priority of (sub)themes, indicators or process/outcomes has been set. 

As it is evident from the literature the design of a common set of principles of flexicurity is by no means an easy task. This is due first of all to the multidimensional character of the concept itself. As described above, flexicurity arrangements may combine different form of flexibility and security both along the flexibility and the security dimension and thus lead to a multitude of possible configurations. To cover these by a “common set of principles” is not a simple assignment.  

Furthermore, complications stem from the diverse national, regional and local contexts within which flexicurity arrangements are to be designed and implemented.

When drafting such principles, two pitfalls are therefore obvious. One will be to draft the principles at such a high level of generality that it will severely limit their value for practical policy deliberation and evaluation. The other risk is that the set of common principles will inflate into a very detailed manual with guidelines for all kinds of specific situations, thus loosing sight of the comprehensive character of the principles. 

10. Contours of “common principles”
The approach taken here in discussing a set of common principles in the following paragraphs is to begin the outline at the highest level of abstraction and then allow them to be developed into more specific guidelines, which can be applicable for specific arrangements and contexts. 

Two observations can be made before the attempt to identify the common principles at the most general level. Firstly, in the present context flexicurity should be conceived as a political strategy rather than as a state of affairs or an analytical tool. This is also the perspective taken by Wilthagen in his early definition of flexicurity (Wilthagen, 1998). 

Following this observation, one may give a few thoughts to the question of what the differentia specifica should be for common principles related to a flexicurity strategy compared to principles or guidelines for political strategies in general. Here two observations can be made:
	Flexicurity policies will normally imply the integration of different policy areas, which call for increased emphasis on interactions between policy elements
	Flexicurity policies will be exceedingly loaded with conflicting interests, since they will almost always imply winners and losers, especially in the short run, and therefore deliberations about compensating mechanisms.

Both these preconditions will influence the focus of the common principles that are outlined below.

Secondly, principles can be related to different aspects of a flexicurity strategy. Based on the standard concepts of policy analysis, one may distinguish between three aspects of a policy: 1) The policy context, 2) The political process and policy implementation and 3) Policy outcome. In case of political strategies aimed at creating some form of flexicurity arrangements, one can the assign one overarching principle to each of this three aspects and therefore at the most general level one can identify three common principles for all flexicurity arrangements:

When it comes to content of the policy in question, the basic criteria must be the principle of integrating flexibility and security. Policies will not fulfil this condition, if they solely imply changes in either some form of flexibility or security. At the core of the concept of flexicurity is the idea that some form of flexibility is combined with some form of security arrangement (safety net), which reduces the actual or potential costs either for employees or for employers of the flexibility in question. Here the flexicurity aspect will imply demands on individuals or employers to adapt to changing situations and also, in a more proactive manner, to take more risks within a given environment. The safety net may be in the form of income security or one of the other forms of security spelled out above. 

A second general standard for flexicurity is related to policy implementation and could be labelled the principle of negotiated trade-offs. In democratic societies, flexicurity arrangements will be designed, implemented and changed through a political process. Furthermore, one may – as stressed by Leschke et al (2006) - imagine situations, where no trade-offs are present, at least not in the longer run. Such flexicurity-arrangements can be conceived as plus-sum games with a positive net gain. But even plus-sum games may have some participants, who face the risk of not experiencing net gains – or who have to wait for their rewards until later periods. Thus, moving from one configuration of levels of flexibility and security to another will involve that one of the parties (typically the employees) must accept some form of increased flexibility (and thus uncertainty) in their working life in order to get compensation in the form of improved security arrangements provided by the employers or the state. For this new situation to be sustainable calls for a high degree of legitimacy, which again must be based on some form of negotiated agreement between actors that have a mutual trust and share some form of common understanding.

Based on the flexicurity-literature one may finally point to a third general principle, which relates to the policy outcome with respect to forming the basis for sustainable employment both in general and with respect to the situation of weak groups on the labour market or in society as a whole. Such ideas are also inherent in all the examples of policy guidelines or assessments quoted in the previous section and lead to the inclusion of a principle of sustainable employment and social cohesion in the set of common principles, as they are defined at the most general level.  
 
Based on these three general principles, one may at a lower level of abstraction identify a set of guidelines or a checklist, which could be applied is assessing the design and implementation of flexicurity arrangements within a specific context.

Thus, based on the principle of integrating the two elements in the flexicurity concept one can develop a set of guidelines which has the following main elements: 

	Both the flexicurity and security elements of the flexicurity strategy must be well defined with respect to the concrete arrangements and the instruments involved.
	The interaction between the flexibility and the security elements must be unambiguous with respect to trade-off(s), positive interactions and vicious circles.
	The distributional aspects of the flexicurity strategy should be analysed. 
	Mechanisms of compensation for potential gains and losses for different groups must be included in the strategy.

Along similar veins one may develop the principle of negotiated trade-offs into a set of common guidelines for the political and social process that shapes the flexicurity arrangements:

	All relevant stakeholders (including those at the local level) should take part in the process of decision making
	The process must be transparent with respect to the distribution of gains and losses from the flexicurity strategy. 
	The political process should include political guarantees that ensure the implementation of the flexicurity strategy over time.
	The flexicurity strategy should mobilize and link resources from different actors.

Finally, one may specify more detailed set of criteria for the outcome of the flexicurity strategy with respect to sustainable employment and integration of weaker groups:

	Ex-ante policy evaluations should be made, which uncover long-term and societal consequences of the flexicurity strategy as a whole, including its effect on institutional competitiveness.
	The flexicurity strategy should in the long run improve the employment options and the quality of employment for all groups on the labour market. 
	The flexicurity strategy should have an advantageous effect the distribution of welfare and living conditions in general. 
	The flexicurity strategy should empower weak groups to cope with their situation both as individuals and in cooperation with others.

Finally, at a third level, one can specify a set of principles in the form of good flexicurity practices with respect all three general principles as they are laid out in the guidelines. A few examples could be:

	Income security can support labour mobility and structural change by increasing willingness to take risks and thus increase numerical flexibility
	Employment security: Institutions for adult vocational training can provide skills that are transferable and improves both functional and numerical mobility
	Combination security in the form of public child-care institutions and maternity leave can supporting mobility of women into work
	Arrangements supporting the flexible retirement of older workers through part-time pensions and similar schemes may increase the integration of older workers on the labour market
	Including the trade unions into the process of policy formation at local level will increase the willingness of workers to enter into flexicurity arrangements, which trades more flexibility of working time or pay for more job or employment security.
	Active labour market programs may support the (re)integration of long-term unemployed onto work and thus provide employment security for this group.


The structure outlined above is summarized in the table presented in the annex.

11. Where is the European Union actually moving?
As mentioned above, flexicurity is now a top issue on the European policy agenda. It was given a prominent role under the Austrian presidency in the spring of 2006. After the call for a set of “common principles” by the European Council in March 2006, a series of activities were initiated by the Commission in order to prepare a Communication from June 2007, which was the basis for a decision of the European Council in December 2007 (European Commission, 2007). 

In the perspective of the Commission and the Council, flexicurity is to be interpreted as having four key elements: a) sufficiently flexible contractual arrangements; b) effective active labour market policies; c) credible lifelong learning systems; d) modern social security systems (cf. also the Joint Employment Report, 2006). It is thus evident that the Commission emphasised a rather general view on flexicurity, which is close to “going Danish”  without including the broader perspective on flexicurity that is promoted in the scientific literature as described in section 3 and 4 above. 

A total of eight “common principles” were decided upon by the European Council:

	Flexicurity is a means to reinforce the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy, create more and better jobs, modernize labour markets, and promote good work through new forms of flexibility and security to increase adaptability, employment and social cohesion.
	Flexicurity involves the deliberate combination of flexible and reliable contractual arrangements. 
	Flexicurity approaches are not about one single labour market or working life model, nor about a single policy strategy: they should be tailored to the specific circumstances of each Member State.
	Flexicurity should promote more open, responsive and inclusive labour markets overcoming segmentation. It concerns both those in work and those out of work.
	Internal (within the enterprise) as well as external flexicurity are equally important and should be promoted. Sufficient contractual flexibility must be accompanied by secure transitions from job to job.
	Flexicurity should support gender equality.
	Flexicurity requires a climate of trust and broadly-based dialogue among all stakeholders, where all are prepared to take the responsibility for change with a view to socially balanced policies.
	Flexicurity requires a cost effective allocation of resources and should remain fully compatible with sound and financially sustainable public budgets.

The documents on the common principles furthermore highlight the various options or “pathways” that are open to specific groups of Member States, but without having the form of more detailed common guidelines known from the European Employment Strategy – or in the words of the report on Employment in Europe from 2006:

The main aim … is to present a preliminary characterisation of the balance between flexibility and security across Member States – to reflect their current institutional setting – and, on that basis, to propose a taxonomy of countries in a reduced number of “flexicurity” systems. This should be seen as preliminary work leading to the Commission’s report on flexicurity scheduled for the end of 2007, which, in addition to describing the current situation, will also present a number of “typical” pathways built around the above-mentioned four principles, that Member States could select in order to improve their balance between flexibility and security (Employment in Europe 2006, p. 76).

With respect to the policy process, the report stressed the need for the policy focus to be shifted from individual policy tools to reform packages that encompass several approaches simultaneously in order to, on the one hand, exploit well documented policy interactions that enhance the benefits of reforms on labour market performance, and, on the other hand, to make policy change politically and socially more acceptable. Whether the national capacity for policy reforms in the Members States can put this ambitious vision of comprehensive reform packages into reality is the main challenge for European employment policy in the coming years. 

For now the Member States have been asked to report on their progress in implementing flexicurity arrangements in their yearly updates on the National reform Programmes for 2008 to 2010. Furthermore the Commission has initiated a special “Flexicurity Mission” that will visit 4-5 Member States, and discuss in depth the state of play as regards the development and implementation of the national pathways based on the common flexicurity principles, agreed at the European Council in December 2007. The Mission consists of the Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunity assisted by a number of high-level politicians, representatives of the social partners and civil servants from the Commission.​[2]​ 

12. Summing up – Why did flexicurity succeed so far?
Thus the most significant observation concerning the entry of the concept of flexicurity on the European political scene is the speed with which the idea has moved from narrow academic circles into the centre of the political arena and is being enthusiastically supported both with politicians covering most of the political spectrum and by the European social partners. However, a core element in understanding this development is of course that the Janus-like character of flexicurity.​[3]​

Firstly, right-wing politicians and employer’s organisations can directly identify with the concept of flexicurity, because of the explicit emphasis on flexibility, which is embedded herein. At the same time Social-Democratic politicians and trade-unions will of course approve the positive view on various forms of social security, which is inherent in the concept and which runs counter to the traditional sceptical view with respect to for instance unemployment insurance, which is generally found in main-stream economics. 

Secondly, both employer’s organisations and trade unions can subscribe to the concept of flexicurity due to the explicit role assigned to the social partners as actors in the negotiations over the balancing between flexibility and security.  Thus support to flexicurity is also a way of promoting the self-interest of the social partners as political and social actors. The harmony of the social partners at both national and European level with respect to the flexicurity discourse is a noticeable empirical illustration hereof. 

However, turning the high hopes of combining more flexible labour markets with improved security arrangements into political reality will in many European countries prove extremely difficult. In most countries of Central and Southern Europe, where traditional job security has been a core form  of security for the workers, the road to substituting this form of protection with more protected mobility between jobs has already met significant resistance.  Here the seventh common principle calling for “a climate of trust and broadly-based dialogue among all stakeholders” will probably be the toughest condition to meet for flexicurity to become implemented as a comprehensive strategy for Europe. 

Annex: An overview of a possible structure of “common principles”

Aspect of flexicurity as a political strategy	Policy content	The political process	Policy outcome
Overarching common principles	Principle of integrating flexibility and security: Does the policy provide both flexibility and security for the same group(s)?	Principle of negotiated trade-offs:Is the policy designed and implemented through a transparent political process involving all relevant stakeholders?	Principle of sustainable employment and social cohesion:Does the policy lead to an increase in overall competitiveness and desirable changes with respect to social cohesion
Checklist	1. Are both the flexicurity and security elements of the strategy well defined with respect to the concrete arrangements and the instruments involved?2. Is the interaction between the flexibility and the security elements unambiguous with respect to trade-off(s), positive interactions and vicious circles?3. Are the distributional aspects of the strategy uncovered? 4. Are mechanisms of compensation for potential gains and losses for different groups included in the design of the strategy?	1. Are all relevant stakeholders (including those at the local level) taking part in the process?2. Is the process transparent with respect to the distribution of gains and losses from the strategy? 3. Does the process involve political guarantees that ensure the implementation of the strategy over time?4. Does the strategy mobilize and link resources from different actors?	1. Are ex-ante policy evaluations made and monitoring activities established, which uncover long-term and societal consequences of the strategy as a whole, including its effect on institutional competitiveness?2. How will the strategy affect the employment options and the quality of employment for all groups on the labour market? 3. How will the strategy effect the distribution of welfare and living conditions in general 4. Will the strategy empower weak groups to cope with their situation both as individuals and in cooperation with others? 
Best practices	Examples	Examples	Examples
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^1	  The present paper is mainly based on Madsen (2007)
^2	  For more information on the Mission, see http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/employment_strategy/flex_mission_en.htm#composition
^3	  This political success of double-sided concepts is of course not exclusive to “flexicurity”, but – with the field of employment policy –has been ascribed to other concepts such as “activation” or “job rotation”.
